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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Implications of Sentencing Aliens without 
Consular Notification
Case 11.753: Ramón Martínez Villareal
On October 10, 2002, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) issued Report No. 52/02 on the
merits of Case 11.753 regarding Ramón Martínez Villareal. This
report is the culmination of an investigation initiated on May
16, 1997 against the United States concerning the murder con-
viction of Ramón Martínez Villareal, a Mexican national. Mr.
Martínez Villareal was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder on May 20, 1983, and has since been incarcerated and
placed on death row in Arizona. The petitioner, the Center
for Justice and International Law, alleged five violations of Mr.
Martínez Villareal’s rights: the failure of the United States to
provide notice of consular assistance under Article 36(1)(b)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention) to which the United States is bound; the failure
of the United States to provide and guarantee effective assis-
tance of counsel to Mr. Martínez Villareal; the failure of the
United States to take into account Mr. Martínez Villareal’s men-
tal competence at the trial and sentencing phases of his crim-
inal proceeding and its obligation not to execute Mr. Martínez
Villareal due to his mental incompetence; the delay in Mr.
Martínez Villareal’s execution; and the unequal application
of the death penalty throughout the United States. The peti-
tioner claimed that these violations of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s
rights by the United States contravene Articles I (right to life,
liberty, and personal security), II (right to equality before
law), XVIII (right to a fair trial), and XXVI (right to due
process of law) of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (American Declaration).
Analysis
The Commission limited its analysis of the merits to the
petitioner’s first claim, based on its finding that the United
States’ failure to comply with Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention was a sufficient basis to find violations of the rights
to a fair trial and to due process of law under the American
Declaration. The Commission further noted it would apply
a heightened level of scrutiny, consistent with the restrictive
approach previously taken by the Commission and other
international human rights authorities in considering issues
regarding the imposition of the death penalty.
In response to the government’s argument that the Vienna
Convention does not vest any private rights in a criminal
defendant, the Commission stated that, based on the current
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
it does not have competence to adjudicate the United States’
responsibility for violations of the Vienna Convention per se.
The Commission nonetheless maintained that Mr. Martínez
Villareal’s right to information and consular assistance under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention constitutes a funda-
mental component of the due process protections to which
he is entitled pursuant to Articles XVIII and XXVI of the
American Declaration. Accordingly, the state’s failure to
respect and ensure this obligation constituted serious viola-
tions of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s rights to a fair trial and due
process. In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission con-
sidered current developments in international law in the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand
case and the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Advisory Opinion 16, which asserted that Article 36
of the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that give
rise to the international responsibility of a state.
At no point did the United States ever allege that Article
36(1)(b) had been satisfied. Rather, it claimed that the Mex-
ican Consulate should have been on notice because of the
media attention attracted by Mr. Martínez Villareal’s arrest.
The Commission not only found this defense to be insuffi-
cient, but stated that the possible knowledge of the Mexican
consular staff did not address Mr. Martínez Villareal’s right
to be informed of his right to consular assistance. 
In evaluating the importance of the state’s compliance
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Commission
noted that granting consular assistance to a criminal defen-
dant helps ensure the protection of the defendant’s due
process rights through the provision of services, including trans-
lation, the collection of mitigating evidence from the defen-
dant’s country, and the preparation of an adequate defense.
In this case, the Commission considered that the record
showed that Mr. Martínez Villareal was arrested and tried
without having a clear understanding of the proceedings.
Mr. Martínez Villareal did not speak English, his attorney did
not speak Spanish, and the earlier stages of the proceedings
were not translated into Spanish. The record also reflected that
Mr. Martínez Villareal did not understand the purpose or com-
position of the jury. There was further evidence that Mr.
Martínez Villareal suffered from mental deficiency at the
time of the trial against him, and that this mental deficiency
was not adequately explored by his attorney. Based on these
findings, the Commission held that the United States’ failure
to comply with the Vienna Convention placed it in violation
of Articles XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration.
The Commission further concluded that if the United States
executes Mr. Martínez Villareal, it will be violation of Article
I of the American Declaration.
Recommendations
In light of the Commission’s finding regarding the viola-
tion of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s rights to due process and a fair
trial, it urged the United States to retry the case in accordance
with the protections prescribed by Articles XVIII and XXVI
of the American Declaration. If a retrial in compliance with
these protections is not possible, the Commission recom-
mended Mr. Martínez Villareal’s release. The Commission fur-
ther advised the United States to review its laws and procedures
relating to foreign nationals who are arrested and incarcerated
to assure that consular notification is integrated into the ear-
liest stages of criminal proceedings. The Commission
announced that it would continue to evaluate the measures
adopted by the United States with respect to the above rec-
ommendations until it reaches full compliance.
Establishing an International Ban on the Execution of Juveniles
Case 12.285: Michael Domingues
On October 22, 2002, the Commission issued Report No.
62/02 on the admissibility and the merits of case 12.285
regarding Michael Domingues. Mr. Domingues was con-
victed of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. On
May 1, 2000, the Commission received a petition from the
Magnus Hirschfield Center for Human Rights and Mark
Blaskey of the Clark County Public Defender on behalf of
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Nomi Dave, a 1999 J.D.graduate of the Wash-ington College of Law
(WCL), is currently working as
an associate protection officer
with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in Guinea, West
Africa. Ms. Dave is a member
of the Junior Professional Offi-
cers (JPO) program, which pro-
vides opportunities for nationals of different countries to
work with UN agencies for a two-year period. She applied to
the JPO program through the U.S. government, which spon-
sors JPOs for UNHCR and the World Food Program.
Although Ms. Dave is a staff member of the UNHCR, her posi-
tion is funded through the U.S. Department of State. Upon
acceptance to the program, she was posted to the UNHCR
Branch Office in Conakry, Guinea. At this duty station, she
works primarily with refugees from Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone, which are currently the main sources of the
refugee population in Guinea.
Ms. Dave’s work focuses on the protection of refugees,
including analysis of issues pertaining to international refugee
law and the legal and physical protection of refugees. In
addition, UNHCR addresses other human rights issues affect-
ing refugees, including arbitrary arrest and detention, free-
dom of expression, freedom of movement, and rights specific
to the needs of women and children in the refugee com-
munity. According to Ms. Dave, the most challenging aspect
of her work involves addressing the basic needs of individu-
als and groups on a daily basis. Each morning she greets a
queue of refugees outside the UNHCR office. She explains
that this group may include people who have not eaten for
days, people who have nowhere to sleep, or those whose
spouses or siblings have been arrested. One of her first
lessons was that working at UNHCR involves a variety of
responsibilities including counseling, social services, and
informal dispute resolution in addition to engaging in legal
analysis. 
Immediately after law school Ms. Dave worked as a
researcher and writer for the UN Secretariat in New York,
focusing on economic and social affairs. Ms. Dave’s advice to
law students is to study topics that they find stimulating and
to keep focused on their chosen fields of interest. Her favorite
law school experience was participating in the International
Human Rights Law Clinic, which she found to be both instruc-
tive and enjoyable.
Ms. Dave is currently beginning to explore new areas of
interest in the law, including issues of cultural rights, economic
and social development, and the protection of children and
the elderly in conflict situations. She plans to pursue writing
opportunities in the future. 
*Inbal Sansani is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
Mr. Domingues. The petition alleged that by sentencing Mr.
Domingues to death for crimes he committed while he was
a juvenile, the United States breached Articles I (right to life),
II (right to equality before the law), VII (right to protection
for mothers and children), and XXVI (right to due process
of law) of the American Declaration. The petitioner alleged
that the United States violated Article I of the American Dec-
laration by breaching the jus cogens norm prohibiting the exe-
cution of juveniles. The petitioner further argued that the use
of the death penalty in a limited number of U.S. states
resulted in arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before
the law in the United States.
Analysis
After ruling that the case was admissible based on evi-
dence that Mr. Domingues had been denied a substantive
appeal of his “illegal sentence” and had therefore exhausted
all domestic remedies, the Commission considered the mer-
its of the claim, focusing first on the allegation that the
United States violated a jus cogens norm. The Commission indi-
cated that it would apply a heightened level of scrutiny
reserved for capital cases. The Commission began its analy-
sis with its 1987 decision, Roach and Pinkerton v. United States,
in which it determined whether a jus cogens norm that pro-
hibits the execution of juveniles existed. The Commission held
in Roach and Pinkerton that, although there was a recognized
jus cogens norm among member states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) that prohibits the execution of chil-
dren, there was no consensus as to the age of majority. Based
on the precedent set by that decision, the Commission
defined the question before it as being whether, since 1987,
the international community had established 18 as the age of
majority.
In determining whether a jus cogens norm had developed
for the age of majority since its 1987 decision in Roach and
Pinkerton, the Commission considered the development of
international treaty law, United Nations resolutions and stan-
dards, domestic practices within individual states, and prac-
tices within the United States. The Commission noted numer-
ous developments that it considered indicative of an
international consensus on 18 as the age of majority. In
reaching its conclusion, the Commission relied on the fact that
191 states are currently parties to the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which provides that no person under the
age of 18 shall receive the death penalty; that 64 countries have
acceded to or ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides that death sentences shall not
be imposed on individuals below the age of 18; that 5 mem-
ber states of the OAS have ratified or acceded to the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the exe-
cution of persons below the age of 18; that 49 countries have
abolished the death penalty since 1986 (making the total of
nations that do prohibit the death penalty 111), and that 20
additional countries that have not carried out an execution
in 10 or more years; and that 16 states in the United States
have expressly chosen the age of 18 as the minimum age for
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eligibility for the death sentence. In considering this and
other evidence, the Commission established that a jus cogens
norm had developed that prohibits the execution of people
under 18. The Commission found that the United States
violated this norm in the Domingues case and breached Arti-
cle I of the American Declaration.
Recommendations
Based on these findings the Commission recommended
that the United States offer Mr. Domingues a commutation
of sentence. The Commission further recommended that
the United States review its laws and procedures to ensure that
the death penalty is not imposed on anyone who was under
the age of 18 at the time of his or her crime. The Commis-
sion announced that it would continue to evaluate the
measures adopted by the United States with respect to the
above recommendations until the United States reaches full
compliance. 
*David Baluarte is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. Ariel
Dulitzky, a principal human rights specialist of the Inter-American
Commssion on Human Rights, provided research support.
courts above, that Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured during
battle in Afghanistan, was properly designated an unlawful
combatant under the president’s war powers. The court, how-
ever, also held that the Third Geneva Convention was a non-
self-executing treaty, meaning that Hamdi could not invoke its
provisions without further congressional action to implement
the treaty domestically. To the contrary, the district court deci-
sions in both Lindh and Padilla found the treaty to be self-exe-
cuting. The court’s decision effectively leaves Hamdi, now in
custody in a naval detention center in Norfolk, Virginia, with-
out access to counsel or further access to the courts. 
Two other related decisions recently before domestic courts
merit mention. In late January 2003, the trial judge in the
federal trial of Zacarias Moussaoui ruled in a closed hearing
that Moussaoui should be provided with access to Ramzi Binal-
shibh, the self-described coordinator of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and also in U.S.
custody, in order to be able to effectively prepare Moussaoui’s
defense to capital charges of his own involvement in those
attacks. Close followers of the trial suggest that the government’s
resolve not to permit the two alleged terrorists to meet may com-
pel them to seek the first known trial before a military com-
mission, a decision which would unquestionably raise further
criticism of such tribunals. Finally, in Boston, the judge who
recently sentenced Richard Reid, the admitted al-Qaeda “shoe-
bomber,” was praised for his strong condemnation of Reid dur-
ing the sentencing hearing. The judge, responding to assertions
by the defense that Reid was a combatant in a war, responded
by repeatedly asserting, “You are not an enemy combatant—
you are a terrorist.” By that reference, the judge seemed to sug-
gest that the criminal law, not the law of war, was the way to deal
with terrorism, thus ironically undermining the administration’s
assertions that their actions are justified as legitimate actions
in the war on terrorism. 
The term “legal black hole” in reference to the status of
the Guantánamo detainees seems to originate with a decision
by the British courts in R (on the Application of Abbasi and
another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
In this case, a British national named Feroz Ali Abbasi, a
Guantánamo detainee since January 2002, complained to
British judges that he had been without access to a court or
any other tribunal, or even to a lawyer, since his arrival in
Guantánamo. His representatives sought to compel the British
Foreign Office to take some action on his behalf to challenge
his arbitrary detention in Cuba. The British court declined,
noting that there were several legal actions pending in the
United States dealing with the matter, and that Mr. Abbasi is
“within the sole control of the United States executive.” The
court did note, however, that although Mr. Abbasi’s deten-
tion as an “illegal combatant” may ultimately be justified,
the judges found it “objectionable . . . that Mr. Abbasi should
be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the
United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to
challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or
tribunal.” It was in that context that the British tribunal
expressed its profoundest desire that the U.S. courts assume
jurisdiction so as not to leave Mr. Abbasi in arbitrary deten-
tion in that “legal black hole” alluded to by Amnesty Inter-
national and others. The British court also noted that the issue
of the validity of the detention in Guantánamo Bay was pend-
ing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
but that “it is as yet unclear what the result of the Commis-
sion’s intervention will be.” 
Finally, the Canadian courts also may take on the issue of
the Guantánamo detentions. Press reports in February of 2003
indicate that a former member of Parliament asked the Que-
bec Superior Court to rule whether Canadian soldiers in
Afghanistan had surrendered alleged enemy soldiers to the U.S.
military for transport to Guantánamo in violation of Canada’s
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. The filing of the
suit followed criticism of the government in the Canadian
House of Commons for its failure to determine if those cap-
tured were prisoners of war prior to their surrender.
The core of the Commission’s precautionary measures rul-
ing lies in its conclusion that the executive branch of the U.S.
government is not entitled to unilateral and unreviewable des-
ignation of the Guantánamo detainees as unlawful combat-
ants under international humanitarian law. What is com-
mon to all three of the domestic court decisions in the cases
involving Lindh, Padilla, and Hamdi is the courts’ assumption
that there was no doubt as to the status of the individuals
involved in those cases; all were legitimately and properly des-
ignated as “illegal,” or more properly “unprivileged” com-
batants, by the executive branch. The petitioners’ position in
the Guantánamo case relies on Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention, which requires that the detainees are entitled to
a presumption of protection of the Third Convention “until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.” Their argument also relies on customary law and
the assertions of many leading international law experts who
maintain that the detainees are entitled to a presumption of
treatment as privileged combatants until a competent tri-
bunal has determined their status. The detainees must be des-
ignated as civilians, combatants, or criminals rather than
lumped into a single composite group of unlawful combat-
ants by presidential fiat. The Commission’s view is not a rad-
ical position but one consistent with established interpreta-
tions of international human rights and humanitarian law. 
*Richard J. Wilson is a professor of law, co-director of the Center
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and director of the Inter-
national Human Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law.
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